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Israel's successful 1985 stabilization program brought sharp, im-
mediate disinflation, a private consumption boom, increased eco-
nomic activity, relatively high real wages and interest rates, and a
low (appreciated) exchange rate.  Only in the fourth year did th.-
boom stop and unemployment  rise. What lessens from that expe-
rience can be applied elsewhere?
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The Israeli stabilization program of 198S is  but will allow an increase in long-term growth
generally considered one of the most successful  after adjustment is completed.
such programs in years.  Under it, the inflation
rate plummeted from about 400 percent a year to  What implications does the Israeli program
about 15-20 percent a year.  - a laboratory experiment in heterodox policy
- have for the debate about gradualism versus
Leiderman and Liviatan examined how  shock treatment in the process of stabilization?
stabilization affected other key economic
variables after 1985. They were particularly  In reducing inflation, the program seems to
struck by the immediate, abrupt reduction in the  have had the same effectiveness as other shock
rate of inflation and the timing and impact of  treatment programs:  there was a sharp and
disinflation on other real variables.  immediate disinflation. This was probably
because multiple nominal targets (such as a
For more than two years after the program, a  fixed exchange rate and price-wage controls)
private consumption boom was accompanied by  were used in conjunction with adjustments in
increased economic activity, relatively high real  fundamentals, right from the start.  This mix
wages and real interest rates, and a low (appreci-  makes the pro-ram heterodox.
ated) real exchange rate.
In terms of the real costs of disinflation, the
Only in the beginning of the fourth year  program may seem more gradualist. The real
after t1.e  program did the consumption boom  costs, in terms of increased unemployment, were
stop, economic activity become stagnant, and  postponed for several years and in the transition
the rate of unemployment rise.  there was actually a boom in economic activity.
The consumption boom seems closely  Which of these results are peculiar to Israel
related to the possibility that the program and  and which are common to heterodox policies
the fixed exchange rate policy partially lacked  generally is a question worth addressing.
credibility.  Apparently the pubiic perceived the
changes as mainly temporary.  Method: Using simple times series tech-
niques applied to monthly data for 1980-88,
The recent rise in unemployment seems  Leiderman and Liviatan investigated changes in
largely to reflect the beginning of a process of  the time series properties of key macroeconomic
structural adjustment whereby resources are  variables in 1985 and after.  They focused
reallocated across the economy to conform to  especially on changes in the tradeoff between
the new low inflation equilibrium. This process  inflation and unemployment.
may involve less growth in the transitional stage
This paper is a product of the Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth Division,
Country Economics  Department. Copies are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Raquel Luz, room N 11  -
059, extension 61588 (56 pages with figures and tables).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
C'- nplex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
Tnte findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thesc papers do not necessarily represent offici.l policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterA  OP  OFCOMM
I.  Introduction  1
II.  The  Change  in  Regimes Facts  and  Models  3
A.  Some  Facts  4
B.  Models  6
III. Times  Seiies  Evidence  and  Comparisons  10
A.  Summary  Statistics  10
B.  Responses  to Shocks  16
C.  Cross-Sectional  Variabilities  20
D.  Persistence  of  Fluctuations  21
E.  Relating  the  Findings  to the  Models  23
IV.  The  Changing  of the  Nature  Inflation/Unemployment  Tradeoff  25
A.  The  High  Inflation  Period  26
B.  The  Post  Stabilization  Period  29
C.  The  Tradeoff  in  the  Transition  29
V.  Conclusions  34
VI.  References  36
The  authors  would  like  to  thank  Plhanan  Uelpman,  Miguel  Kiguel,  and.
participants  at  a  World  Bank  seminar  for  their  comments  and  suggestions.
This  paper  is  part  of  World  Bank  RPO  674-24.1
I.  INTRODUCTION
The  Israeli  stabilization  program  of 1985  is generally  considered  as
one  of the  most successful  programs  of recent  years,  in that  it rapidly
disinflated  the  economy  from  inflation  rates  of  about  400  percent  per  year  to
rates  between  15-20  percent  per  year. While  much  attention  has  been  devoted
to the  heterodox  components  of the  program  and  their  analytical  foundations, 1
relatively  little  work  has  been  done  quantitatively  comparing  the  structure
and  performance  of  the  macroeconomy  before  and  after  the  program. Yet, such  a
comparison  can  be regarded  as a key  ingredient  in an  overall  evaluation  of the
pros  and  cons  of  programs  such  as that  of  Israel.
Accordingly,  the  main  objective  of this  paper  is  to examine  how
macroeconomic  performance  has  changed  after  the  implementation  of the
stabilization  program  and  to determine  whether  these  changes  conform  with the
predictions  of standard  macroeconomic  models. We investigate,  using  simple
time  series  techniques  applied  to  monthly  data for  1980-83,  the  changes  that
have  taken  place  in the  time  series  properties  of key  macroeconomic  variables
after  the  stab4iization  program  of 1985.  Special  attention  is  given  to
changes  in  the  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment  which  are  apparent
after  the  program.
The  notion  that  a change  in the  policy  regime  should  cause  changes  in
the  relationships  among  macroeconomic  variables  is  quite  familiar  since  Lucas'
(1976)  critique. We focus  here  on some  of the  empirical  implications  of this
critique. Comparing  policy  regimes  before  and  after  1985  suggests  that
the  post-program  regime  is  characterized  by a  tight  fiscal  policy,  and  by a
1 See,  (.g.,  Blejer  and  Liviatan  (1987),  Bruno  (1986),  Bruno  and  Piterman
(1988),  Fischer  (1987),  Helpman  and  Leiderman  (1988),  Kiguel  and  L'viatan  (1988),
and  Liviatan  (1989).2
sharp  decrease  in the  degree  of  exchange  rate  accomodation  as reflected  in
the  fixing  of  the  exchange  rate,  which  was  viewed  as  the  main  anchor  for  the
nominal  system.  For  other  nominal  variables  it  is  less  clear  whether  and  how
their  rules  of  behavior  have  changed  after  the  program.  Prices  of  controlled
goods  and  services  were  periodically  adjusted  to  changes  in  the  rate  of
inflation.  Monetary  policy  was  mainly  conducted  so  as  to  provide  indirect
support  for  the  exchange  rate  anchor  and  it did  not  target  directly  monetary
aggregates  such  as  Ml or  M2.  Wage  policy  resulted  in slow  transition  of COLA
and  of other  institutional  features  of the  wage setting  process  toward  a low
inflation  position. The  upshot  of this  discussion  for  the  analysis  that
follows  is that  it seems  plausible  to  hypothesize  that  the  program  brought  a
decrease  in the  degree  of accommodation  of  nominal  policy  variables,  effected
mainly  through  a decrease  in  exchange  rate  accommodation.
Policy  regime  changes  such  as the  above  can  be expected  to  have
affected  relations  between  key  macro  variables. First,  less  accommodative
exchange  rate  and  nominal  policies  can  cause  changes  in  the  form  of the
tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  Second,  these  less  accommodative
policies  are  likely  to result  in  changes  in  the  persistence  (or  inertia)  of
inflation  and  other  nominal  variables. Third,  to the  extent  that  after  the
program  there  is a  more  dominant  role  of real  shocks  relative  to  nominal
shocks,  as it is likely  to  be the  case  given  the  less  active  role  of  nominal
policy  variables  after  the  program,  it is likely  that  there  would  be changes
in the  relations  between  variabilities  of relative  prices,  relative  wages,  and
relative  outputs  across  sectors  in the  economy. Moreover,  this  enhanced
importance  of real  vs.  nominal  shocks  can,  by itself,  result  in  changes  in the
form  of the  inflation/unemployment  tradeoff. Fourth,  lack  of credibility  of3
the  new  policies  can  result  in  high  real  wages,  high real  interest  rates,  and
a consumption  boom  at the  start  of the  stabilization  program  and  thus
importantly  affect  the  transition  of the  economy  to its  new
equilibrium. Identifying  these  types  of changes  in  macroeconomic  performance
is  the  focal  point  of this  research.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. Section  II  briefly  describes  the
main  changes  in the  behavior  of  nominal  policy  variables  brought  about  by the
stabilization  program. It also  discusses  the  predictions  of standard  macro
models  tor  the  likely  impact  of these  changes  on the  economy. Sectijn  III
provides  evidence  on  macroeconomic  performance  in  the  Israeli  economy  before
and  after  the  disinflation  program. We investigate  and  interpret  the  time
serias  behavior  of  key  macro  variables  and  characterize  their  changes  in terms
of  means,  standard  deviations,  correlations,  responses  to shocks,  and  degree
of  persistence.  We also  examine  changes  in  the  co-movements  of cross
sectional  variabilities  of relative  prices,  wages,  and  outputs. Changes  in
the  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment  (Phillips  curve)  are  discussed
and  analyzed  in section  IV.  Section  V concludes  the  paper.
II.  THE  CHANGE  IN  REGIME: FACTS  AND  MODELS
We begin  this  section  by describing  briefly  the  main  nominal  policy
rule  changes  brought  about  by the  1985  program. Later  on,  we turn  to  a
discussion  of standard  macroeconomic  models  in order  to get  analytical
guidance  as to  what  to expec.  when comparing  the  Israeli  economy  before  and
after  the  program.4
A.  Some  Facts
Since  the  Israeli  program  has  been  described  in  detail  elsewhere  (see
Fn.l  on page  1),  we focus  here  briefly  on its  main  aspects  that  are  relevant
for  analysis  of the  effects  of  changes  in the  rules  governing  the  evolution  of
nominal  policy  variables. Comparing  the  policy  regimes  before  and  after  the
program  suggests  that  there  were  at least  five  main changes  brought  about  by
the  disinflation  program. First,  there  was  a fiscal  contraction  as the  public
sector  sharply  reduced  its  fiscal  deficit  by  about  9 2 of GNP. About  half of
this  reduction  was effected  by a decrease  in  public  sector  consumption  and the
remaining  half  by increasing  taxes.
Second,  the  government  adopted  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime. 2 Fixing
the  exchange  rate  was conceived  as a  key  element  in  anchoring  the  nominal
system  at  a low  inflation  equilibrium.  The  Israeli  Shekel  was initially
pegged  to the  U.S.  dollar,  but later  on (August  1986)  the  pegging  was  done
relative  to a  basket  of foreign  currencies. 3 Thus,  the  authorities  abandoned
the  previous  policy  of using  devaluations  in  a one-sided  manner  to affect  real
wages  and  external  balance,  and  adopted  the  view  that  further  changes  in
exchange  rate  policy  would  have to reflect  cooperative  agre-ments  between
government,  labor,  and  employers. It is in this  spirit  that  the  devaluations
of  January  1987  and  of December/January  1988/89  have  to  be interpreted.  Since
the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy,  coupled  with  other  internal  aad  external
developments,  resulted  in  marked  real  appreciation  trends  of real  exchange
rates,  it  was changed  early  in 1989  toward  more flexibility.  That is,  the
2  The  shekel  was  devalued  by  102  in  January  1987  and  by  132  in  January  1989.
Since  the  latter  date  the  exchange  rate  is  targeted  within  a  band  of +3X.
3  This  was facilitated  by a  1.5  billion  US$  grant  from  the  U.S.  governmentexchange  rate  is  being  targeted  now  within  a relatively  fixed  band rather  than
at a specific  fixed  race.
Third,  there  have  been  changes  in  wvrge  policy  toward  disinflation.
It appeare  that  after  the  program  there  was an increase  in the  importance  and
length  of  nominal  contracts  and  an increase  in the  fraction  of  wage  changes
that  are  due to  agreements  at the  company  or  plant  level  as opposed  to
centralized  collective  agreements. 4 Of special  interest  in this  context  is
the  evolution  of the  cost  of living  agreement  (COLA). COLA's  structure  has
been  gradually  changed  so  that  the  trigger  level  of inflation  (for  actual
payment  of indexation)  has  been raised  and  the  frequency  of COLA  payments  has
been  reduced. The  agreement  reached  in  February  1989  stipulates  wage
indexation  payments  once  every  six  months  (and  not  every  three  months  as
before),  at a rate  of 85 percent  of the  excess  of the  inflation  rate  beyond  3
percent  during  these  six  months. Though  these  changes  represent  important
adjustments  in the  transition  to  a low  inflation  economy,  one  can  certainly
question  why progress  in  this  direction  has  been relatively  slow  in  the  face
of the  fast  disinflation  that  took  place  and  whether  the  present  agreement  is
indeed  appropriate  under  the  current  rates  of inflation  of less  than  20Z  per
year.  The  slow  adjustment  of COLA's  structure  may  well reflect  partial  lack
of credibility  of the  stabilization  program.
Fourth,  there  was  a shift  to  a tight  monetary  policy. Immediately
after  the  program  the  monetary  authority  targeted  commercial  bank  credit  to
the  pri-vate  sector,  which  was considered  as an  additional  nominal  anchor.
Later  on,  there  was a shift  toward  targeting  real  M3  with a  view toward  the
economy's  international  reserves'  position. In  addition,  real  interest  rates
4 For  a  detailed  discussion,  see  Artstein  and  Sussman  (1988).6
were  kept  high  to affect  the  current  account  and  the  state  of aggregate
demand. Obviously,  some  of the  observed  increases  in  MI and  other  shekel-
denominated  assets  capture  the  effects  of disinflation  on the  composition  of
private  portfolios.  Fifth,  in  Israel  government  directly  determines  prices  of
goods  and  services  whose  weight  in  the  consumer  price  index  is  of about  20-30
percent; e.g.,  prices  of public  transportation,  gasoline,  and  basic
foodstuff. Given  the  sizable  weight  of these  controlled  prices,  and  their
importance  in government  (subsidies)  budget,  the  stabilization  program
stipulated  a government  policy  of changing  them  at a rate  compatible  with the
attempted  low  inflation.
Overall,  the  policy  regime  after  the  program  features  a decrease  in
the  degree  of exchange  rate  accommodation.  This  decrease  was supported  by a
tight  fiscal  policy. Whethez  and  how  the  degree  of accommodation  of other
nominal  policy  variables  changed  after  the  program  remains  Rs  an open
queption.
B.  Models
What  are  the  possible  implications  of these  facts  for  macroeconomic
performance?  Here  we attempt  to answer  this  question  in the  light  of two
classes  of standard  macro  modelss contracting  models  and  imperfect
information  models. 5
i.  Contracting  Models
Models  of the  Fischer  (1977)-Taylor  (1979)  variety  emphasize  the  role
of contractual  rigidities  in  generating  real  costs  of disinflation.  In
S We do not examine  here the more recent  real business  cycle  approach
because  its  implications  for  short  run  impacts  of stabilization  policies  remain
yet  to  be analyzed.7
particular,  the  models  posit  a  nonstate  contingent  structure  of overlapping
multi-period  wage contracts.  As a result,  ending  inflation  is  generally
costly  (in  terms  of  unemployment)  because  firms  and  workers  are  locked  into
long  term  nominal  contracts  that  were  negotiated  on the  basis  of  price  and
wage expectations  formed  in the  past. 6 A tradeoff  between  the  variance  of
inflation  and  the  variance  of  output  arises  from  these  frameworks.  In these
models,  the  degree  of accommodation  of  nominal  policy  variables  plays  a  key
role  in  determining  the  shape  of  this  tradeoff  between  output  and  inflation
variabilities.  For  example,  high  monetary  accommodation  to  nominal  wage
shocks  generally  results  in  higher  output  stability  but  at the  cost  of
generating  higher  price  instability.
To sharpen  the  discussion,  consider  the  impacts  of  a decrease  in the
degree  of nominal  exchange  rate  accommodation  in the  context  of Dornbusch's
(1982)  open  economy  analysis  of contracting  models. The  exchange  rate  is
postulated  to  affect  both  demand  and  supply  sides  of the  macroeconomy,  and
some  of the  results  are  ambiguous  depending  on the  relative  strength  of these
two  effects. The  analysis  indicates  that  a decrease  in  exchange  rate
accommodation  lowers  the  variability  of  prices  and  has  ambiguous  effects  on
the  variability  of output. The  latter  is  decreased  when  the  cost  channel  of
exchange  rates  dominates,  but  it is  increased  if  the  aggregate  demand  role  of
the  real  exchange  rate  dominates. To the  extent  that  the  move toward  lower
exchange  rate  accommodation  is accompanied  by decreased  monetary
accommodation,  there  is  a fu:rther  decrease  in  price  variability  and  a
6 This  class  of models  implies  that  there  can  be a costless  di.inflation
only if there  is a gradual  tightening  of fiscal  and  monetary  policies  with a
timing  that  pays  attention  to the  persistence  in nominal  wages that  was built
in by old  wage contracts.a
dampening  or even  offset  of the  effects  on  output  variability  that  arise  from
the  supply  side  effects  of the  exchange  rate. Numerical  examples  provided  by
Dornbusch  (1982)  indicate  that  starting  with  high  degrees  of exchange  rate  and
monetary  accommodation,  a  decrease  in the  former  accompanied  by  no  major
change  in the  latter  leads  to  a  marked  reduction  in  price  variability  with
only  a  minor  change  in  output  variability.  The  model  has  also  implications
for  per3istence 7 and  for  the  impact  of  unanticipated  disturbances  on output.
Specifically,  when the  aggregate  demand  effect  dominates,  a decrease  in
monetary  or  exchange  rate  accommodation  lowers  the  persistence  of  wages  and
prices  through  time  and  raisos  the  impact  of  unanticipated  disturbalces  on
output. This  discussion  of persistence  has to  be qualified,  however,  in that
it  assumes  no change  in  the  frequency  of  wage  and  exchange  rate  adjustments.
To the  extent  that  a disinflation  program  results  in  less  frequent  exchange
rate  and  wage  adjustments,  it  can  contribute  toward  higher  and  not lower
persistence  of  nominal  disturbances.  Thus,  a  moLe  complete  analysis  would
indicate  ambiguous  effects  of exchange  rate  accommodation  on persistence.
Taking  into  account  changes  in the  frequency  of exchange  rate  and  wage
adjustments  following  disinflation  would  strengthen  the  above  described  rise
in the  impact  of unanticipated  disturbances  on output  in response  to a
decrease  in  exchange  rate  accommodation.
ii.  Imperfect  Information  Models.
These  models  posit  that  agents'  imper'-  ?t  information  about  current
and  future  real  and  nominal  shocks  is  the  main factor  explaining  observed
Phillips  curves. Movements  in  output  and  other  real  variables  can  result  from
7 In this  model  persistence  is defin,d  as the first  order  dutoregressive
coefficient  of a given  dynamic  variable.9
rhanges  in  nominal  variables  only  to the  extent  that  the  latter  are  not fully
known  with certainty. In Lucas'  (197S)  setup,  producers  cannot  fully
determine  the  eztent  of relative  price  change  from  current  information  about
their  own  nominal  price. Under  these  conditions,  the  slope  of the  aggregate
supply  schedule  (inverse  Phillips  curve)  depends  on the  relative  importance  of
real (relative)  vs.  nominal  (aggregate)  shocks. The  higher  the  importance  of
real (relative)  shocks,  the  flatter  becomes  the  aggregate  supply  schedule  in
the (price,  output)  plane,  and  the  stronger  is  probably  the  tradeoff  between
inflation  and  unemployment.
To the  extent  that  following  a disinflation  program  there  is a
diminished  role  of nominal  shocks,  and  other  things  equal,  it can  result  in a
more  pronounced  observed  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  While
there  are  some  methods  for  measuring  the  relative  importance  of real  vs.
nominal  shocks,  additional  information  on this  issue  can  be obtained  by
examining  the  comovements  between  the  variabilities  of prices  and  outputs
across  sectors  in  the  economy. As shown  by Cukierman  (1983),  imperfect
information  models  imply  (under  some  restrictive  assumptions  regarding
parameter  values)  that  when  nominal  aggregate  shocks  dominate,  these
variabilities  can  be expected  to  move  in opposite  directions.  That  is,  an
increase  in the  variance  of  nominal  aggregative  shocks  reduces  demand  and
supply  relative  price  elasticities  in  each  market  and  thus  results  in  higher
relative  price  dispersion  but  lower  output  variability  across  sectors.
However,  cross  sectional  output  and  price  variabilities  would  move  in the  same
direction  in the  presence  of dominant  real  shocks. Thus,  under  the  maintained
hypothesis  of these  models  it  may  be expected  that  while  before  a  major
disinflation  program  these  output  and  price  variabilities  moved  in  opposite10
d..rections,  they  moved  in  unison  after  disinflation.
III.  TIME  SERIES  EVIDENCE  AND  COMPARISONS
In  this  section,  we present  time  series  evidence  on  changes  in  the
relations  between  key  macro  variables  that  occurred  after  the  program. We
assemble  and  interpret  the  evidence  in the  light  of the  models  discussed  in
the  previous  section. We start  by looking  at summary  statistics  such  as  means
and  standard  deviations  --  the  latter  taken  here  as a  measure  of the  degree  of
variability  of different  variables  --  as  well as  by examining  changes  in
contemporaneous  cross  correlations.  Then,  we investigate  how  the  dynamics  of
selected  variables  changed  after  the  program  by studying  their  responses  to
shocks. We first  consider  responses  to  own shocks  and later  on responses  to
shocks  in other  variables. Then,  we turn  to  evidence  on the  cross  sectional
variabilities  of output  growth,  real  wage  growth,  and  relative  prices  which
provide  indication  as to  whether  there  has  been  a change  in the  type  of shocks
that  are  dominant. Last,  we investigate  whet1-er  the  persistence  of  economic
fluctuations  changed  after  the  program. We conclude  the  section  by
summarizing  the  key  findings  and  by discussing  the  extent  to  which  they
conform  with the  models.
A.  Summary  Statistics
Our  discussion  in this  subsection  is  mainly  based  on Table  1  and
Figures  1 to 4.
i.  Means
The  first  two  columns  of panel  la in  Table  1 report  monthly  means  for
a set  of  macroeconomic  variables  before  (i.e.,  1980:2-1985:6)  and  after  (i.e.,
1986:1-1988:12)  the  disinflation  program  of 1985.  It  can  be seen  that  before11
the  program  prices,  money,  wages,  and  nominal  exchange  rates  were increasing
at a rate  of about  9  percent  per  month. The  stabilization  program  resulted  in
a remarkable  reduction  in the  rate  of inflation  to  a rate  of  about  1.3  percent
per  month. Growth  rates  for  other  nominal  variables  changed  in  different
patterns. Some  variables  feature  a lower  rate  of growth  than  the  rate  of
inflation  in the  post  stabilization  period,  but  others  increased  at  much
higher  rates  than  inflation. Specifically,  while  exchange  rates  for  the
dollar  and  the  basket  of foreign  currencies  depreciated  at a lower  rate  than
inflation,  there  were  relatively  high  rates  of growth  of  nominal  wages,  Ml.
and  credit  in the  later  period. Overall,  and  as transparent  from  Figures  1
and  2, there  have  been  two  patterns. Some  nominal  variables  have shown
movements  that  have  been  aligned  well in the  later  period  with those  in  the
rate  of inflation; see  Figure  1 for  evidence  on the  growth  rates  of the
nominal  ex,change  rate,  controlled  prices,  and  M3 money. However,  there  has
been  some  nonsynchronization  after  the  program  between  the  growth  rates  in
wages,  Ml money,  and  credit  and  the  rate  of inflation; see  Figure  2.
Turning  to real  variables,  there  has  been  a slowdown  in the  rate  of
growth  of industrial  production 8 and  of  employment  after  the  disinflation,
from  monthly  growth  rates  of .73  and .20  percent  respectively  before  the
program  to rates  of .51  and .16  after  the  program. These,  however,  have  not
been  major  changes;  see  Figure  3.  Quantitatively  more important  changes  show
up for  the  rate  of unemployment,  which  increased  from  5.13  percent  to 6.58
percent,  and  in  private  consumption  purchases,  which  have increased  at a  more
rapid  rate  in  the later  period;  see  Figure  4.  Though  the  rate  of unemployment
8 Domestic  gross  investment  increased  significantly  in 1986  but its  rate
of growth  fell.12
increased  immediately  after  the  implementation  of the  program,  this  increase
partly  represents  a continuation  of  existing  trends  from  before  the  program.
In  addition,  from  the  first  quarter  of 1986  on there  was a  downward  trend  in
unemployment  --  a trend  that  was reversed  in  1988  and  early  1989  and  has
resulted  in a rate  of unemployment  of about  8 percent.
It is straightforward  to translate  the  evidence  in the  first  panel  of
Table  1 into  evidence  regarding  relative  price  type  variables. Some  of these
calculations  are  reported  in the  third  panel  of the  table. Two  key features
of the  data  are  the  almost  tripling  in  the  rate  of growth  of the  real  wage in
the  later  period  and  the  real  appreciation  of  the  Israeli  shekel,  as inflation
exceeded  the  rate  of  devaluation  during  that  period. Despite  the  sharp
increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  at the  start  of the  program,  the  real
interest  rate  for  the  1983-88  period  is  only  slightly  higher  (on  average)  than
in  the  previous  period. However,  since  it  is likely  that  there  has  been  a
fall  in the risk premium component of the interest rate, associated with a
decrease  in inflation  uncertainty,  the Onet*  real  interest  rate  may  well be
much  higher  after  the  program  than  before  it.
The  evidence  on the  monthly  trade  deficit  indicates  that,  despite
some  reduction  immediately  after  the  program,  in  dollar  terms  the  deficit  has
remained  quite  unchanged  after  the  program  at a level  of about  $240  million;
see  Figure  3.  However,  the  deficit  was somewhat  reduced  in  real  terms  and
relative  to GDP.
ii.  Standard  Deviations
Tne  middle  two  columns  of  Table  1,  panel  la,  can  be used  to analyze
changes  in the  variability  of these  variables,  measured  by their  3tandard
deviations.  For  most  nominal  variables,  there  has  been  a decrease  in their13
standard  deviations,  along  with the  above  discussed  decrease  in  mean rates  of
growth. In  particular,  the  standard  deviations  of inflation  and  most  other
nominal  variables  after  the  program  are  at levels  of about  20-30  percent  their
previous  levels;  a similar  pattern  holds  generally  for  coefficients  of
variation  also  reported  in  Table  1.9
In  contrast  to this  general  pattern,  there  has  been  a relatively
minor  change  in the  variability  of the  rates  of growth  of  nominal  wages  and  of
Hl after  the  program. Thus,  for  these  variables  the  observed  decreases  in
their  mean rates  of growth  were  not  accompanied  by a decline  in  their  standard
deviations  --  a somewhat  puzzling  finding.  We have  checked  changes  in  the
standard  deviations  of these  two  variables  for  each  one  of the  three  years
from  1986  to 1988.  It  appears  that  the  standard  deviations  of the  rate  of
growth  of  nominal  wages  and  of  Ml have  remained  high for  each  one  of these
years. Specifically,  the standard  deviation  of  movements  in  wage growth  were
8.05,  5.99,  and  5.63  in  1986,  1987,  and  1988  respectively,  and  those  for  Ml
growth  were 7.52,  8.15,  and  8.56  respectively.  This  evidence  indicates  that
the  relatively  high  variabilities  of these  variables  during  1986-88  are  not
the  result  of particularly  high  variability  in  a given  year.  Not  only  that
changes  in  the  mean  growth  rates  of  wages  and  Ml have  not  been  synchronized
with the  rate  of inflation,  but  nonsynchronization  has  also  been  present  when
comparing  changes  in the  standard  deviations  of inflation  and  of these  two
variables; see  again  Figure  2 for  general  evidence  on such  nonsyn-
chronization.  Among  the  possible  reasons  for  these  phenomena  we can  mention
the  following:  (i)  the  adjustment  of Hl  may  well  be the  net result  of gradual
9  Notice  that  coefficients  of  variation  would  not  be  well  defined  measures
of  variability  for  variables  whose  means  are  close  to zero.14
and  time  varying  shifts  in  agents'  portfolios  toward  shekel  denominated
assets;  (ii)  the  adjustment  of  wages  may reflect  increased  staggering  and
sectorial  variability  as  well as interference  of economy-wide  wage norms  with
sectorial  adjustments  toward  equilibrium;  see  Artstein  and  Sussman  (1988).
The  volatilities  of real  variables  have  changed  less  markedly,  if at
all,  after  the  program  than  those  of the  nominal  variables. The  standard
deviations  of the  rate  of growth  of industrial  production  and  of the  rate  of
unemployment  increased  in the  later  period. On the  other  hand,  the  standard
deviations  of the  rates  of growth  of  employment  and  of consumption  decreased
in  the  later  period. The  variability  of the  trade  deficit  has  not  changed
much after  the  program. For  relative-price  type  variables  there  is  generally
some  decrease  in  their  variability  after  the  program.
These  findings  suggest  that  generally  there  has  been  a  decrease  in
the  relative  variability  of  nominal  vs. real  quantity  variables  in the  post
stabilization  period. This  conclusion  would  not  be incompatible  with
characterizing  the  later  period  as one  in  which  there  has  been  an increase  in
the  quantitative  importance  of real  shocks  as compared  to that  of  nominal
shocks. In addition,  the  notion  that  when inflation  is sharply  reduced  this
induces  less  variability,  both  over  time  and  across  sectors,  in relative-
price  variables  is supported  by the  data.
iii. Cross  Correlations
Cross  correlations  between  monthly  movements  in  inflation  and  in
other  key  nominal  variables  are  reported  in  panel  lb  of Table  1 for  the
periods  before  and  after  the  disinflation  program. Before  the  1985
stabilization  program,  there  were relatively  large  correlations  between
inflation,  rates  of growth  of monetary  aggregates  (HI,  M3, and  credit),  the15
nominal  interest  rate  and  the  rate  of change  of the  exchange  rate. These
monthly  cross  correlations  generally  reached  values  in  the (.65,  .80]  range.
The  period  after  1985  features  a  marked  reduction  in  these  correlations.  In
fact,  some  of them  became  negative,  such  as the  correlations  between  inflation
and  monetary  aggregates.  This  may  well capture  a shift  toward  a less  indexed
nominal  side  cf the  economy  and  toward  smaller  accommodation  after  the
program.
The  evidence  supports  the  notion  that  before  the  plan  there  was a
strong  and  close  association  between  monthly  movements  in  key  nominal
variables.  This  has  changed  after  the  implementation  of the  plan,  in that
there  are  now  much  weaker  links  within  the  nominal  side  of the  system.
Cross  correlations  between  monthly  movements  in inflation  and
selected  real  variables  are  reported  in  panel  lc of Table  1.  Not
surprisingly,  the  correlations  between  monthly  movements  in inflation  and  in
real  variables  are  much smaller  than  those  reported  in  part lb  of the  Table.
Upon  comparing  correlations  before  and  after  the  program,  notice  that  while
before  mid-1985  there  was a positive  link  between  inflation  and  the  rate  of
unemployment,  the  relation  between  these  variables  becomes  negative  in the
later  period. Thus,  the  statistical  (monthly)  Phillips  curve  appears  to  have
changed  as  a result  of the  program.
Considering  jointly  the  evidence  in  panels  lb and  lc  of Table  1
reveals  that  the  signs  and  sizes  of cross  correlations  between  monthly
movements  in inflation  and  in  other  macroeconomic  variables  have  generally
changed  after  the  disinflation  plan. These  changes  are  more  pronounced  for
the  nominal  variables  than  for  the  real  variables  --  a pattern  that  held  also
generally  for  comparisons  involving  means  and  standard  deviations.16
B.  Responses  to Shocks
Having  discussed  the  evidence  on some  summary  statistics,  we turn  now
to an examination  of  whether  and  how the  dynamics  of key  macroeconomic  time
series  have  changed  after  the  implementation  of the  disinflation  program. To
achieve  this  goal,  bivariate  autoregressions  are  estimated  and  transformed
into  moving  average  form (or  impulse  response  functions)  in  which  the  impact
of shocks  can  be  measured. The  estimated  equations  are  of the  form
'4
(1)  xt  - Aixt_i  +  et
i-i
where  xt  - (It,yt)',  with  X  denoting  the  rate  of inflation  and  y denoting  any
other  variable  entering  the  autoregression  (e.g.,  y may  denote  the  rate  of
growth  of  money). The  moving  average  for  this  system  is  given  by
U
(2)  xt  3  E  Biet-i
where  the  Bi matrices  can  be obtained  from  the  Ai matrices; see  Sims  (1980).
For  our  purposes,  it is  convenient  to  orthogonalize  the  covariance  matrix  of
the  e's  thus  yielding  the  representation
(3)  x~t  - E  Cei
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where  e* denotes  the  orthogonalized  disturbances.
Bivariate  autoregressions  such  as in  equation  (1)  were estimated  for
the  rate  of inflation  and  another  variable  selected  those  appearing  in Table
1.  Each  such  run  was implemented  on  monthly  data  twice:  for  the  80:6-85:6
period,  i.e.  before  the  disinflation  program,  and  for  the  85:12-88:12  period.
Before  we discuss  changes  in  the  impacts  of shocks,  it  is  well to  turn  to
Table  2  which  reports  evidence  on the  size  of the  shocks  in  both time  periods.
The  shocks  in the  system  are  measured  by the  estimated  disturbances  in  the
econometric  equations; thus,  wage shocks  are  the  disturbances  to the
bivariate  regression  of the  rate  of change  of  wages  on four  own  lagged  values,
four  lagged  values  of the  rate  of inflation,  and  a  constant. For  inflation
shocks,  we used  the  disturbances  from  the  autoregression  including  lagged
inflation  and  wage  growth  as explanatory  variables. The size  of the  shocks  is
measured  by the  standard  error  of the  estimated  disturbances.
The  evidence  reported  in  Table  2 is  quite  consistent  with that
reported  in Table  1.  That  is,  the  size  of  most  nominal  shocks  has generally
decreased  by a large  extent. Standard  deviations  of  nominal  shocks  in the
post  1985  period  are  at about  25-35  percent  of  their  levels  before  the
program. The  exceptions  are  shocks  to  nominal  wage growth  and  to  Ml growth,
which  had in  the  later  period  standard  deviations  of the  same  order  of
magnitude  as in the  first  period. For  real  variables,  the  picture  is somewhat
different  in  that  for  most shock-type  quantity  variables  there  have  been  only
relatively  minor  changes  in standard  deviations.  Thus,  this  evidence  tends  to
support  the  notion  that  real  shocks  have  become  more important  relative  to
nominal  shocks  in the  period  after  the  1985  stabilization  program.18
To examine  the  nature  of  the  changes  in  the  dynamic  responses  to
shocks  we use  Figures  5 to  8 and  begin  by looking  at the  responses  of each
variable  of interest  to its  own  shocks. The  first  chart  in Figure  5  depicts
the  response  of inflation  through  time  to  a unit  shock  (i.e.,  one  standard
deviation)  in the  rate  of inflation  in  period  1 as  calculated  for  the  periods
before  and  after  the  disinflation  program. The  Figure  also  reports  responses
of  wage growth  and  of  .11  growth  to respective  own  unit shocks. Two  main
features  are  salient  in Figure  5. First,  there  is generally  less
own-persistence  in  the  impact  of the  shocks  in  the  first  2-3  periods. For
example,  against  the  same  unit shock  to the  inflation  rate  there  is a smaller
rate  of inflation  by period  4  after  the  program  than  before. Second,  there
has  been  an increase  in  the  variability  of the  responses  through  time  after
the  program. There  is  now  more  pronounced  cyclicality  in  the  process  of
convergence  following  the  shocks.
Figure  6  presents  evidence  on responses  to own  shocks  for  variables
that  have  been  subject  to greater  control  by policymakers  than  those  in the
previous  figure. These  are  tae  rate  of change  of the  exchange  rate  (basket),
the  rate  of change  of controlled  prices,  and  the  rate  of  change  of credit. It
is seen  that  for  each  one  of these  variables  responses  to  own shocks  show  less
persistence  after  the  program,  especially  in  the  first  few  periods  immediately
after  the  shocks  and  there  is a somewhat  faster  convergence  back  to the  steady
state  or control  values  of zero. This  seems  to  be consistent  with stronger
attempts  by policy  makers  to  bring  these  nominal  variables  back  to their  pre-
shock  levels  more rapidly  than  in the  period  before  the  program.
Responses  of real  variables  to unit  shocks  in their  values  are
presented  in Figure  7.  Shocks  to the  rate  of growth  of employmeat  and  to the19
rate  of unemployment  seem  to  have slightly  larger  persistence  in  the  first
periods  Rfter  the  shocks. Altogethr.,  however,  there  are  no major  changes  in
the  responses  of real  variables  to their  own  shocks  after  the  1985  program.
Some  evidence  regarding  changes  in cross  effects  before  and  after  the
program  is  provided  in Figure  8.  In  all  cases  we consider  the  effects  of
inflation  shocks  on other  variables. The  first  two  charts  depict  the
responses  of  wage growth  and  MI  money  growth  to  unit shocks  in inflation. It
can  be seen  that  these  shocks  generate  a less  accommodating  short  term
response  of nominal  wages  and  Ml in  the  post-program  period. These  responses
show  a greater  degree  of  volatility,  or cyclicality,  in  the  later  period.
Considering  the  effects  of infl  . ion  shocks  on the  rate  of change  of the
exchange  rate,  in  the  third  chart  of the  figure,  indicates  that  the  shocks
have  a  much smaller  impact  and result  in somewhat  less  variability  of the  rate
of change  of the  exchange  rate  than  before  the  program. This  probably
reflects  the  decrease  in exchange  rate  accommodation  implied  in the  use  of the
exchange  rate  as  a policy  variable  in the  process  of  disinflation.  The  last
chart  in the  figure  gives  the  responses  of employment  growth  to inflation
shocks. After  the  program,  there  is  a stronger  short  run  impact  of inflation
shocks  on the  rate  of change  of  employment  and  the  latter's  responses  show
higher  volatility  than  before  --  this  last  finding  is similar  to that  reported
above  for  wage  and  Ml growth.
Another  type  of cross  effects  arises  from  considering  the  response  of
inflation  to shocks  in  the  other  variables. The  evidence,  not  reported  here
in  charts  for  brevity,  is straightforward:  shocks  in  other  variables  have  a
much smaller  impact  on the  rate  of inflation  after  the  program. Thus,  the20
disinflation  program  appears  to  have  weakened  the  link  going  from  shocks  to
key  macro  variables  to  the  process  of inflation.
C.  Cross-Sectional  Variabilities
The  conclusion,  based  on Tables  1 and  2,  that  it appears  that  there
is  a less  important  role  of  nominal  vs. real  shocks  after  the  program  is now
further  verified  by turning  to cross  sectional  variabilities.  We discussed  in
the  previous  section  the  predictions  of imperfect  information  models  regarding
the  direction  of  comovement  between  price  and  output  cross  sectional
variabilities.  Figure  8a plots  three  measures  of  variability:  of relative
prices  (across  10  broad  categories  in  the  CPI),  relative  growth  rates  of
output  (across  6  main sectors  such  as industry,  agriculture,  construction,
etc.),  and  relative  rates  of growth  of real  wages  (across  9 main sectors). We
consider  the  latter  two  measures  at  applying  to real  variables. In  each  case,
variability  is  measured  by  weighted  cross  sectional  variances. 10
There  are  two  salient  features  of Figure  8a.  First,  there  has  been  a
decrease  in  cross  sectional  variabilities  after  the  1985  program. In
particular,  the  index  of dispersion  of relative  prices  after  the  disinflation
has  become  about  one-third  of its  value  before  the  program. This  finding  is
in line  with the  observed  positive  co:relation  between  inflation  and  relative
price  dispersion  that  has  been  documented  for  several  countries. Similarly,
there  has  been  a decrease  of about  20  percent  in the  variability  of real  wage
growth  rates  after  1985. There  has  been  a somewhat  slower  downward  adjustment
10 The  data source  for  our  calculations  is  Bank  of Israel's  Annual  Report
(various  issues).21
of relative  real  wage growth  variability  than  that  of relative  price.. 11
Second,  notice  the  form  of corovement  between  these  three  measures  of
dispersion  before  and  after  the  program. Up to 1984  there  was generally  a
common  movement  of the  variabilities  of  output  growth  and  real  wage  growth,  in
opposite  direction  to that  of the  variability  of relative  prices. Thus,
periods  with  high  price  variability  were typically  also  periods  of low
variability  of output  growth  and  wage growth  across  different  sectors. This
pattern  chansed  after  1985,  in  that  the  three  variabilities  appear  to  be
positively  correlated  since  then. Using  these  patterns  to classify  time
periods  according  to the  relative  importance  of real  vs.  nominal  shocks,  as
suggested  in the  previous  section,  provides  further  support  to the  hypothesis
that  real  shocks  have  become  more  dominant  after  the  program. Notice  also
that  while  1987  was  a year  with remarkably  low  values  of our  three  measures  of
dispersion,  they  all  show  increases  in 1988  and  especially  so  the  variability
of output  growth  rates.
D.  Persistence  of Fluctuations
Has  there  been  a change  in  the  degree  of persisv.ice  of  macroeconomic
fluctuations  after  the  disinflation  program? We interpre.  persistence  in  a
time  series  sense  and  measure  it  by the  variance  ratio,  used recently  by
Cochrane  (1988). Consider  time  series  for  a given  variable,  say  the  rate  of
inflation  ft.  The  variance  ratio  consists  of  dividing  (1/k)  times  the
variance  of k-differences  in  r  by the  variance  of its  first  differences:
11  This  may  partly  reflect  the  interference  of  %conomy  wide  range  wage  norms
imposed by the program with different  stages ot.  adjustment  to long term
equilibrium  of different  sectors. See  Artstein  and .ussman  (1988).22
(4)  V(k)  - (l/k)Cvar(ft  - ft-k)Ivar(ft  -t)]
One  extreme  case  of  persistence  is  when  ft follows  a random  walk.  In this
case,  the  variance  of k-dLfferences  in  X  grows  linearly  with  k and  the
variance  ratio  is equal  to one. Under  these  condLtions  fluctuations  in i  are
permanent  and  the  underlying  process  is  nonstationary.  At the  other  extreme
is the  case  in  which  it follows  a  stationary  (mean  reverting)  process. The
variance  of k-dlfferences  in  1t approaches  then  a constant  equal  to twice  the
variance  of the  series  and  the  variance  ratio  approaches  zero  for  large  k;  in
thLs  case,  fluctuations  in  X  are  transitory.  Between  these  two  extremes  there
are  cases  in  which  fluctuations  in  u are  partly  permanent  and  partly
temporary,  as  when the  series  are  a  combination  of a random  walk  and  a
stationary  component. In  these  more  general  cases  the  variance  ratio  provides
a  measure  of the  relative  importance  of the  permanent  component,  in  that  for
large  k it settles  down  to  the  ratio  of the  innovation  variance  of  the  random
walk component  to the  variance  of first  differences.
Variance  ratios  adjusted  for  small  sample  bias  are  reported  in  Table
3 and  Figure  9  provides  plots  of the  ratios  for  four  variables:  the  rate  of
inflation,  the  rate  of  unemployment,  the  rate  of change  of the  real  exchange
rate,  and  the  real  interest  rate. For  each  variable  the  ratios  are reported
for  periods  before  and  after  the  disinflation  program. In each  case  we used
monthly  data  and  k  - 13.  Caution  is suggested  in regarding  the  findings  as
definitive  because  small  samples  are  being  used  and  standard  errors  are  not
provided.
Comparing  persistence  before  and  after  the  program  yields  two  main
patterns. On the  one  hand,  no  major  change  in  variance  ratios  shows  up for23
the  nominal  variables  such  as  the  rate  of inflation,  and  the  rates  of growth
of  MI,  wages,  controlled  prices,  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  etc.  See  in  this
context  the  first  chart  in  Figure  9  which  gives  the  variance  ratio  for  the
rate  of inflation. It is seen  that  before  and  after  the  program  fluctuations
in inflation  were primarily  transitory,  as indicated  by the  variance  ratios  of
.16  and .12  respectively  (for  k - 13).12
Variance  ratios  for  real  variables,  on the  other  hand,  yield  a
somewhat  different  pattern. The ratios  reported  in  Table  3 indicate  that
there  has  been  an increase  in the  degree  of persistence  of fluctuations  in
some  real  variables  after  the  program,  especially  so for  the  rate  of
unemployment,  the  rate  of change  of the  real  exchange  rate,  and  the  real
interest  rate  (see  their  variance  ratios  plotted  in Figure  9).  This  increased
persistence  of unemployment  after  the  program  may  well reflect  a process  of
structural  adjustment  and reallocation  of resources  across  sectors;  see
Section  IV below.
E.  Relating  the  Findings  to  the  Models
In sumarizing and  interpreting  the  evidence  presented  above  we would
like  to  highlight  siz  main results. First,  it seems  safe  to characterize  the
post 1985  regime  as  one  with a lower  degree  of exchange  rate,  and  perhaps
overall  nominal  accommodation.  That  is,  there  is  weaker  transmission  of
changes  in the  rate  of inflation  into  changes  in other  nominal  variables  after
the  program. This  finding  is especially  relevant  for  contracting  models,
where  changes  in  the  degree  of accommodation  of  nominal  policy  variables  play
12  Notice,  however,  that  there  are  subperiods  before  the  program  in  which
inflation  persistence  may  have  well  increased,  as  in  the  inflation  outburst  that
occurred  from  late  1983  to  mid 1985;  see  again  Figure  1.24
an important  role  in  changing  macroeconomic  performance.  We discussed  earlier
(in  Section  II)  the  predictions  of these  models  regarding  the  effects  of
lowering  the  degree  of  nominal  accommodation  and  will explain  shortly  how
these  predictions  fit  the  data. Second,  changes  in the  size  of the  shocks  and
in the  direction  of comovements  of cross-sectional  variabilities  generally
indicate  a larger  role  of real  vs.  nominal  shocks  after  dicinflation.  To the
extent  that  this  enhanced  importance  of real  shocks  can  be associated  with  a
greater  role  of relative  disturbances,  then  imperfect  information  models  would
predict  that  this  will induce  an increase  in  economic  agents'  responsiveness
to perceived  rel&'tive  prices  --  an  effect  that  may result  in  a flatter
Phillips  curve. Third,  there  appears  to  be a  more  pronounced  tradeoff  between
inflation  and  unemployment  in  the  later  period. This  is  consistent  with the
analysis  of  contracting  models,  which  predict  that  lowering  the  degree  of
nominal  policy  accommodation  should  result  in a larger  impact  of unanticipated
disturbances  on  output  and  on  other  real  variables. This  finding  is  also in
line  with imperfect  information  models,  as discussed  above. In the  next
section  we will  discuss  the  statistical  links  between  inflation  and
unemployment  in the  transition  from  high to low  inflation. Fourth,  the
tradeoff  between  output  variability  and  inflation  variability,  if existent,
has shifted  downward  such  that  inflation  variability  has  diminished  and  output
variability  shows  very little  change. Interestingly,  this  pattern  conforms
quite  well  with  the  outcomes  from  numerical  examples  applied  to open  economy
contracting  models  by  Dornbusch  (1982);  see  our  discussion  in  Section  II
above. Fifth,  the  evidence  on changes  in  persistence  is  not  clearcut.
Perhaps  this  is  not  surprising  given  the  theoretical  ambiguities  that  arise
when analyzing  the  impact  of lower  nominal  accommodation  on persistence  in25
contracting  models. Sixth,  after  the  program  there  has  been  a decrease  in the
dispersion  of relative  prices  across  different  sectors. Thus,  the  idea  that
reducing  inflation  leads  to  a decrease  in  the  high-inflation  induced  'noise'
component  of relative  prices  seems  to  be supported  by che  evidence. Also,
real  relative  price  type  variables  such  as real  exchange  rates  and  real
interest  rates  exhibit  lower  variability  through  time  after  the  program.
While  we obviously  recognize  that  our  findings  are  not  based  on
definitive  tests  of  a  model  or set  of  models,  we regard  the  evidence  presented
thus  far  as  harmonious  with the  predictions  of standard  macroeconomic  models.
IV.  THE CHANGING  OF THE  NATURE  INFLATION/UNEMPLOYMENT  TRADEOFF
This  section  provides  further  evidence  on the  inflation/unemployment
tradeoff  before  and  after  the  program. We begin  by examining  statistical  and
econometric  Phillips  curves  before  and  after  the  program  and  move on to
investigate  the  relations  between  the  rate  of  unemployment  and three  important
variables: the  real  exchange  rate,  the  real  interest  rate,  and  the  real  wage.
We focus  on the  timing  of  changes  in  unemployment  and  on the  difficulties  in
attempting  to  account  for  the  observed  timing  with standard  macro  models.
Four  years  after  the  implementation  of the  stabilization  program  it
has  become  clear  that  the  remarkable  disinflation  that  took  place,  from
inflation  rates  of about  9.3  percent  per  month  to rates  of about  1.3  percent
per  month,  has  been  accompanied  by an increase  in the  rate  of  unemplcyment
from  about  5  percent  per  month  before  the  program  to  about  8 percent  in  early
1989;  see  Figure  10 for  half-yearly  data.
The  observed  empirical  relation  between  inflation  and  unemployment
exhibits  a positive  association  between  these  variables  in the  high  inflation26
period  and  practically  no systematic  relation  after  stabilization.  By
contrast,  inflation  and  unemployment  appear  to  be strongly  negatively  related
when comparing  the  means  of these  variables  before  and  atter  stabilization.
Thus,  with the  benefit  of  hindsight,  the  empirical  Phillips  curve  for  the  high
inflation  period  had  no predictive  value  with regard  to  what  was to  be
anticipated  for  after  the  program.
These  facts  raise  the  question  of  why the  empirical  relation  between
these  two  variables  is so  different  within  regimes  as compared  with the
transition  between  regimes,  and  especially  what  are .he  causes  for  the
negative  relation  in the  latter  case. The  case  of the  transition  is  of course
the  more important  aspect  of this  discussion  since  it is  only in this  case
that  a tradeoff  is indeed  observed. In  what follows,  we suggest  some  answers
to these  questions.
A.  The  High  Inflation  Period
In this  period  the  behavior  of inflation  and  unemployment  seems  to
reflect  the  economy's  reaction  to policy  makers'  actions  intended  to influence
another  policy  target:  the  economy's  external  balance. When  the  balance  of
payments  gets  into  a crisis  and  international  reserves  are  being  depleted  --
as in 1979-80  and  1983-84  --  this  consideration  probably  takes  precedence  over
the  targets  of  having  low  inflation  and  unemployment.  In fact,  both  inflation
and  unemployment  may  become  instruments  in  dealing  with such  a criRis. Under
these  circumstances,  and  assuming  an indexed  economy,  a  positive  association
may emerge  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  Yet  this  association  has
nothing  to  do  with the  tradeoff  between  these  variables  that  is relevant  in
the  context  of a disinflation  program. When the  stress  on the  balance  of27
payments  is relieved,  there  is  probably  room  for  policy  makers  to shift
attention  toward  stabilizing  inflation.  However,  this  shift  did  not
materialize  in the  period  before  1985. Although  an attempt  was  made to combat
inflation  back  in 1982-83,  it  was  not supported  by an  adjustmaent  in fiscal  and
monetary  fundamentals.  Therefore,  it seems  plausible  that  such  attempt  did
not  confront  a tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment.
The reasoning  behind  a positive  association  between  inflation  and
unemployment  in  periods  of  balance  of  payments  crises  is as follows. Handling
these  crises  normal'y  requires  improving  competitiveness  by effecting  a real
devaluation  and  a drop  in real  wages.  In  principle,  the  latter  could  be
accomplished  by a reduction  in  nominal  wage growth  which  possibly  will also
induce  a decrease  in inflation.  However,  in  a  highly  indexed  economy  in  which
workers  are  not  willing  to  make  wage concessions  the  adjustment  is somewhat
different. Put  a  bit  more formally,  we can  express  the  average  real  wage over
a  given  period  (say  a year).  wR, in such  an  economy  as
(5)  wR * g(wP,  ,  n)
.(+)  ( -)  (+)
where  wP denotes  the  peak real  wage (i.e..  at  the  time  of the  COLA  payment)
and  n denotes  the  frequency  of COLA's  per  year. When improving
competitiveness  requires  at least  some  drop  in real  wages,  and  unless  workers
are  willing  to change  the  wage  agreement  as reflected  in  wP and  in  n, the  only
viable  alternative  is to raise  F.  This  can  be accomplished  by raising  the
rate  of  devaluation  (as  in the  1984  crisis)  and  by raising  public  sector
prices  (as  in 1980). In fact,  the  evidence  provided  in  Figure  12 indicates
that  there  were aevere  cuts  in real  wages  in  the  context  of the  upward28
adjustments  in the  rate  of inflation  that  followed  the  1979  and  1984  balance
of payments  crises.
So far  for  the  increase  in inflation  in  coping  with  a deterioration
in  external  balance. What  about  unemployment?  Since  the  solution  of a
balance  of payments  crisis  typically  involves  also  contractionary  fiscal  and
monetary  policies,  in order  to reduce  spending  and imports,  there  may  be a
tendency  for  the  rate  of  unemployment  to rise. This is  intensified  by
government's  direct  attempts  to restrict  growth  of employment  in the  public
sector. These  combined  policies  may  contribute  toward  increased  unemployment;
see  Figure  12 for  evidence  in  this  regard  for  the  1979  and  1984  episodes. The
overall  outcome  of these  policies  is  compatible  with observing  a positive  link
between  inflation  and  unemployment.  This  link  is somewhat  confirmed  by the
regression  equations  (1)  and (2)  in Table  4.  These  are  univariate  and
multivariate  Phillips  curve  type  equations. In  both  cases,  the  coefficient  on
the  rate  of  unemployment  is  positive,  and  in  equation  (1)  it  is significantly
different  from  zero.
In  between  these  two  balance  of  payments  crises,  the  exchange  rate
was used,  especially  for  about  one  year  after  September  1982,  as a  means  to
reduce  inflation  by adopting  a  policy  of  devaluing  at  a rate  of 5  percent  per
month  which  was  about  2 percent  below  the  ongoing  rate  of inflation.  The fact
that  now inflation  was used  as  a target  was not  sufficient  to create  a
tradeoff  in the  course  of the  policy. Thus,  the  point  83/1 in  Figure  10 is
one  with relatively  low  inflation  and  low  unemployment.  What  appears  to  be a
main  explanation  for  this  outcome  is  the  combination  of the  direct  effect  of
slowing  down  devaluations  on the  rate  of inflation,  and  the  lack  of
credibility  of the  policy  which  stimulated  consumption  spending  and  hence29
economic  activity. These  effects  of  perceived  temporariness  and  of lack  of
credibility  of government  policies  are  further  explored  in  what follows.
B.  The  Post  Stabilization  Period
For  the  period  after  the  stabilization  program,  Figure  10 indicates
no clear  pattern  of relation  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  There  were
two  peaks  for  the  rate  of unemployment;  one  in  the  second  half  of 1985,
immediately  after  the  program,  and  the  other  one  in  the  second  half  of 1988.
In early  1989,  the  rate  of  unemployment  reached  an overall  peak level  of about
8  percent. It is  evident  that  disinflation  was  achiceed  quite  rapidly,  yet
unemployment  increased  only  gradually  through  time. In fact,  the  points  for
1986  through  1988  in  Figure  10 suggest  movements  in  the  rate  of  unemployment
that  were  not  accompanied  by changes  in  the  rate  of inflation.  Consequently,
the  statistical  Phillips  curve  for  this  period  is  approximated  by a horizontal
line.
C.  The  Tradeoff  in the  Transition
Despite  these  mixed  patterns  within  subperiods,  it  is evident  that
comparing  the  economy's  position  before  and  after  the  program  (see  the  broad
averages  plotted  in  points  B and  A of Figure  10)  yields  a statistical  tradeoff
between  the  rates  of inflation  and  unemployment.  This  is  somewhat  confirmed
by the  econometric  evidence  provided  in Table  4, equations  (3)  and (4). Both
the  latter  suggest  that  when one  considers  the  entire  1980-1988  period  for
estimation  purposes,  the  coefficient  describing  the  inflation/unemployment
tradeoff  becomes  negative  and  marginally  significant.  Thus,  while  a
positively  sloped  statistical  Phillips  curve  may  have  prevailed  in the  period30
up to mid-1985,  and  no clearcut  relation  emerged  for  the  post 1985  period,  the
statistical  tradeoff  emerges  when  comparing  the  pre  and  post  program  periods.
It is  precisely  when  a strong  disinflation  is  attempted  and  achieved  that  we
see  an inverse  relation  between  inflation  and  unemployment  arising  from  the
data.
Modern  macroeconomic  theory  treats  the  Phillips  curve  as a reduced-
form  relation. Behind  it  there  is  a set  of fundamental  factors  that  determine
its  shape. Changes  in these  factors  can  lead  to  changes  in the  reduced  form.
Key  among  these  fundamental  factors  are  the  existing  macroeconomic  policies,
their credibility,  private  sector's  expectations,  the  type  of shocks
affecting  the  economy,  the  existing  rigidities  in  the  system,  etc.  To further
examine  how some  of these  factors  are  captured  in  the  inflation/unemployment
tradeoff  in the  transition  from  high  to low  inflation,  we present  in  Figure  11
the  relations  in  the  data  between  the  rate  of  unemployment  and  three  important
relative-price  type  variables:  the  real  exchange  rate,  the  real  interest  rate,
and  the  real  wage.  Comparing  the  half-year  averages  in Figure  11  before  and
after  the  stabilization  program  suggests  a clearcut  patterns the  increase  in
the  rate  of unemployment  after  the  program  was  accompanied  by a real  exchange
rate  appreciation,  by an increase  in  the  real  interest  rate,  and  by an
increase  in  the  real  wage. And,  as in  the  case  of Figure  4.1,  these  links  are
more  pronounced  when  comparing  performance  across  the  pre  and  post  periods
than  when looking  at the  relations  within  each  subperiod.
Examining  the  figures  and  the  data  suggests  that  the  behavior  of the
rate  of unemployment  after  the  program  followed  a cycle  consisting  of three
phases. In  the  initial  stage  of six  to  nine  nonths  inflation  was simply
reduced  by a combination  of orthodox  and  heterodox  policies. This  was31
accompanied  by  an  increase  in  unemployment  for  about  a  year  and  a  drop  in
industrial  production  for  about  two  to three  quarters. However,  the  size  of
these  recessionary  tendencies  was relatively  smalls  a  spectacular  disinflation
was then  effected  without  major  losses  in  output.
The  second  phase  is  characterized  by a boom  in  private  consumption
spending  in 1986-87  which  stimulated  economic  activity. The  main features  and
explanations  for  this  boom  have  been  analyzed  in  more detail  in  an earlier
paper  by Liviatan  (1989). The  data  indicate  that  while  private  consumption
spending  amounted  to 53  percent  of GDP  in  1984-84,  this  ratio  increased  to  59
percent  during  1986-88. Though  partially  offset  by decreases  in private
investment  and  public  consumption,  these  changes  in  consumption  dictated  the
direction  of change  in  total  domestic  uses  which  increased  by 9  percent  in
1986  and  by 6.1  percent  in 1187. GDP  growth  for  these  years  was 3.6  and 5.2
percent  respectively.  Overall,  then,  the  1986-87  period  was one  of  booming
private  consumption  and  economic  activity,  high  real  wages 13 and  real  interest
rates,  and  a low  real  exchange  rate.1 4 Liviatan  (1989)  discussed  several
explanations  for  the  consumption  boom  after  stabilization  and  reached  the
conclusion  that  the  boom is  most  probably  due  to  an initial  perception  that
stabilization  is  only  temporary 15 -- an  argument  which  is in line  with recent
theoretical  work by Calvo  (1987)  and  by Helpman  and  Razin  (1987).
13 The  fact  that  output  growth  accelerated  in spite  of the  growth  of real
wages suggest  that  the  economy  was driven  by demand  factors.
14 Helpman (1988)  has argued  that some of these  comovements  cannot  be
accounted  for  by  models  of  pure  competition.  Instead,  they  can  be explained  by
using  a framework  of  oligopolistic  competition.
15  Similar  booms  have  been  documented  for  several  Latin  American  countries
after  the  implementation  of stabilization  programs;  see  e.  g. Liviatan  (1989).32
Phase  three  started  in  1988,  when there  was  a slowdown  in  private
consumption  growth  and  in the  growth  of  GDP,  which  was about  1.6  percent  for
that  year.  Industrial  production  started  to fall  and  unemployment  reached
unprecedented  levels  in 1989. While  these  recent  developments  have  not  yet
been fully  analyzed,  it  appears  that  an important  part  of the  recent  increase
in  unemployment  can  be explained  by a combination  of factors  that  resulted  in
a  profit  squeeze  for  the  business  sector  in recent  years. First,  the  cycle
discussed  above  was such  that  it resulted  in  persistently  high  real  interest
rates,  high  and  increasing  real  wages,  and  continuous  real  appreciation  of the
Israeli  shekel. Second,  there  were  decreases  in  subsidies  to  the  corporate
sector,  and  an increase  in  tax  rates  on corporate  profits. Third,  there  was  a
decrease  in  public  sector's  demands  for  goods  and  services  from  the  private
sector  --  a decrease  that  was probably  perceived  by the  business  sector  as
permanent. Fourth,  the  uprising  in the  occupied  territories  contributed  to a
downturn  in  economic  activity.
In addition  to these  factors,  it  appears  that  the  recent  increase  in
unemployment  reflects  a slow  adjustment  of the  economy's  structure  to the  new
economic  environment  with low  inflation.  This  adjustment  entails  major
reallocations  of resources  among  sectors. Thus,  factors  of  production  had to
be reshuffled  between  financial  and  nonfinancial  activities  to  accommodate  the
decrease  in  the  intensity  of the  former. Similarly,  in  the  high inflation
regime  many large  combines  (such  as government  and  labor  union  enterprises  and
transportation  cooperatives)  relied  on government  support  in  periods  of
financial  and  liquidity  crises. Such  support  was gradually  eliminated  after
the  program  and  therefore  these  combines  had  to contract  their  activities.33
Interestingly,  these  allocative  effects  of disinflation  have  great
similarity  with those  in the  aftermath  of the  German  hyperinflation;  see
Garber  (1982). During  the  hyperinflation  in  Germany,  there  was a  policy  of
subsidizing  the  capital  goods  industry  through  the  inflation  tax  revenue.
When  this  source  of revenue  was terminated  and  a 'Rationalization  Period'  was
started,  a  major  reallocation  of resources  was required,  with  capital  and
labor  moving  out  of the  capital  goods  industry. It is this  reallocation  that,
in  Garber's  (1982)  view,  generated  the  transitional  costs  of disinflation
which  showed  up in  a decrease  of industrial  production  by about  20 percent  in
less  than  one  year  and  an increase  in  the  rate  of unemployment  to  22 percent
of  union  members. Similarly  to  the  case  of Israel,  these  developments  did  not
occur  immediately  after  disinflation  but instead  emerged  with a lag (that  is,
one  and  a  half  years  after  the  November  1923  reform).
Finally,  we relate  these  developments  to standard  macroeconomic
models  such  as those  discussed  in  Section  II.  In these  models,imperfect
information  and  contractual  rigidities  determine  the  transition  path  of the
economy  from  high to low  inflation.  Once  these  imperfections  and  rigidities
are  removed,  disinflation  is  not  predicted  to  have  an impact  on real  output,
unemployment,  and  other  real  variables. The fact  that  the  rate  of
unemployment  has  markedly  increased  to about  8 percent  only three  years  after
the  program  does  not  appear  to be  explained  by the  existence  of these
imperfections  and  rigidities.  Thus,  even  if agents  correctly  perceive  and
predict  the  new  policy  regime  and  even  under  an  heterodox  policy  package  there
may  be real  costs  associated  with disinflation  to  the  extent  that  the latter
entails  a process  of structural  adjustment  consisting  of  major  reallocations
of resources  across  sectors.34
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Much of the  evidence  obtained  from  comparing  macroeconomic
performance  in Israel  before  and  after  the  stabilization  program  of 1985
conforms  well  with standard  macro  models. The  decreases  in exchange  rate  and
nominal  accommodation  and  the  enhanced  importance  of real,  as  opposed  to
nominal,  shocks  that  characterize  the  post-program  regime  appear  to  have
strengthened  the  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  They  have  also
been  associated  with a decrease  in inflation  variability  and  no major  change
in the  stability  of output  or other  real  variables. Cross-sectional
variabilities,  of relative  prices,  outputs,  and  real  wages,  have changed  in  a
direction  compatible  with the  notion  that  indeed  real  shocks  have become  more
dominant  in the  low  inflation  economy.
'What  are less  standard  from  the  standpoint  of conventional  theories
are  the  immediate  and  abrupt  reduction  in  the  rate  of inflation,  and  the
timing  and  form  of the  impact  of disinflation  on real  variables. For  more
than  two  years  after  the  program  there  was a private  consumption  boom  that  was
accompanied  by increases  in economic  activity  and  by relatively  high real
wages  and  real  interest  rates  and  a low (appreciated)  real  exchange  rate.
It is only  in the  beginning  of  the  fourth  year  after  the  program  that  the
consumption  boom stopped,  economic  activity  was stagnant,  and  there  was  a rise
in  the  rate  of unemployment.  It seems  difficult  to  explain  these  developments
solely  on the  basis  of  models  stressing  the  role  of imperfect  information  and
contractual  rigidities.  The  consumption  boom  appears  to  be closely  related  to
partial  lack  of credibility  of the  program  and  of the  exchange  rate  policy.
Apparently  the  public  perceived  the  changes  as  mainly  temporary. In  addition,35
the  recent  rise  in  unemployment  seems  to reflect,  to an important  extent,  the
begLnnLng  of a process  of structural  adiustment  whereby  resources  are
reallocated  across  the  economy  to conform  with the  new  low  inflation
equilibrium.  This  process  may  involve  a reduction  of growth  in  the
transitional  stage,  but  wvll  enable  an increase  in long  term  growth  after  the
completion  of the  adjustment.
Considering  the  Israeli  program  as a laboratory  experiment  in
heterodox  policy,  we can  address  its  implications  so  far  for  the  well-known
debate  between  gradualism  vs. shock  treatment  in the  process  of stabilization.
From  the  point  of view  of reducing  lnflation,  the  program  seems  to  have  had
the  same  advantage  as of shock  treatment  policiest There  was a sharp  and
immediate  disinflation  after  mid-1985. This  was  probably  due  to the  use  of
multiple  nominal  targets  (such  as a  fixed  exchange  rate  and  price-wage
controls)  in  conjunctior.  with adjustments  in fundamentals  right  at the  start
of the  prog%am  --  a  mix that  makes  the  program  heterodox. From  the
perspective  of the  real  costs  of disinflation,  the  program  resembles  more a
gradualist  policy. The  real  costs,  in  the  form  of increased  unemployment,
were  postponed  for  several  years  and  in  the  transition  there  was actually  a
boom  in economic  activity. Which  of these  features  of the  results  of the
program  are specific  to  Israel  and  which  ones  are  common  to  heterodox  policies
applicable  to other  countries  is an important  question  that  needs  to  be
addressed  in  the  future.36
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Table  1 - S_macy  Statistics  - Israel:  1980-1988  (Monthly  Data)
la.  Means,  Standard  Deviations,  and  Coefficients  of  Variationa
Variable  Meanb  Standard  Coefficient
Deviationb  of  Variationb
(2  rate  of change)  J.L  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)
CPI  9.36  1.34  5.03  0.89  2.70  0.59
Price  of Controlled  Goods  9.48  1.39  6.44  1.04  4.38  0.78
Price  of Free  Goods  9.32  1.33  4.95  0.98  2.63  0.71
Nominal  Wage  9.83  2.46  7.85  6.50  6.27  17.18
Exchange  Rate (Basket)  8.71  0.70  5.29  1.55  3.21  3.43
Exchange  Rate (Dollar)  9.37  0.21  5.05  1.35  2.72  8.67
Ml  Money  8.23  3.81  7.90  8.30  7.58  18.08
M3  Money  10.03  1.67  6.27  2.74  3.92  4.50
Credit  9.20  3.22  5.26  1.64  3.01  0.84
Interest  Ratec  11.44  3.75  5.12  0.62  2.29  0.10
Industrial  Production  0.73  0.51  8.78  9.62  lOS.60  181.46
Employment  0.20  0.16  1.52  1.31  11.55  10.73
Rate  of  Unemploymentc  5.13  6.58  0.78  0.97  0.12  0.14
Consumption  0.69  0.91  7.16  5.05  74.30  28.03
Real  Wage  0.47  1.11  7.80  6.48  129.45  37.83
Real  Exchange  Rate (Basket)  -0.64  -0.64  3.25  1.78  -16.50  -4.95
Real  Exchanga  Rate (Dollar)  1.43  -1.13  3.35  1.73  7.86  -2.64
Real  Relative  Price  of  Controlled  Goods  0.13  0.05  3.24  0.85  80.75  14.45
Real Interest  Ratec  2.09  2.41  3.79  1.22  6.87  0.62
Trade  Deficitd  244.91 237.46  62.65  66.09  16.03  18.40
Trade  Deficit/GDPe  0.12  0.08  0.031  0.023  0.008  0.006
Notes:
a)  Data  definitions  and sources  are  provided  in  Appendix  1.
b)  Columns  (B)  refer  to  the  period  1980:2-1985:6;  i.e.,  before  the  implementation
of  the  1985  stabilization  program.  Columns  (A)  apply  to  the  1986:1-1988:12  post
stabilization  period.
c)  Level (and  not rate  of  change).
d)  Level,  in  millions  of dollars.
e)  Trade  deficit  in  domestic  currency  units  divided  by a  monthly  measure  of  GDP.39
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lb.  Correlations  Matrix  for  Inflation  and  Selected  Nominal  Variablesa
DP  DW  DM1  DM3  DC  DPC  DER  INT
DP  1.00
DV  .33  1.00
(.08)
DM1  .17  .46  1.00
(-.27)  (.33)
DM3  .66  .28  .48  1.00
(-.33)  (.12)  (.60)
DC  .66  .40  .41  .64  1.00
(-.10)  (.34)  (.32)  (.32)
DPC  .87  .19  .19  .61  .55  1.00
(.62)  (.04) (-.19) (-.39)  (.04)
DER  .80  .34  .32  .73  .80  .67  1.00
(-.00) (-.19) (-.09)  (.15)  (.33)  (.10)
INT  .72  .40  .37  .58  .78  .59  .75  1.00
(-.27)  (.04)  (.31)  (.46)  (.24) (-.17)  (.23)
Notes:  a)  The  variables  DP,  DW,  DM1,  DM3,  DC,  DPC, and  DER denote  the  rates
of change  of the CPI, nominal  wage, M1, M3, credit,  controlled  prices,  and
nominal  (basket)  exchange  rate.  INT  denotes  the  nominal  interest  rate.  Each
entry  gives  a  correlation  coefficient  for  the  period  1980:2-1985:6.  Figures  in
parentheses  are  correlation  coefficients  for  the  period  1986:1-1988:12.40
(Table  1 - cont.)
lc. Correlations  Matrix for Inflation  and Selected Real Variablesa
DP  UNE  DIP  DEMP  DCON  DRER  RIR  DRW
DP  1.00
UNE  .38  1.00
(-.21)
DIP  -.17  .23  1.00
(-.10)  (.19)
DEMP  -.26  .14  .49  1.00
(-.25)  (-.00)  (.54)
DCON  -.27  .06  .34  .12  1.00
(.02)  (.09)  (.19)  (.04)
DRER  -.24  .17  .50  .29  .25  1.00
(-.50)  (.07)  (-.03)  (.14)  (.05)
RIR  -.35  .35  .21  .23  .27  .45  1.00
(-.87)  (.07)  (.00)  (.16)  (-.00)  (.54)
DRW  -.31  -.05  .17  .40  .30  .19  .33  1.00
(-.05)  (-.01)  (.39)  (.35)  (.06)  (-.14)  (.08)
Notes:  a)  The  variables DP, DIP, DEMP, DCON, DRER, and DRW denote the rates
of change of  the CPI,  industrial production, employment, consumption,  real
exchange rate, and real wage.  UNE and RIR denote, respectively, the rate of
unemployment and real  interest rate. Each entry  gives a  correlation  coefficient
for  the  period  1980:2-1985:6.  Figures  in  parentheses  are  correlation
coefficients for the period 1986:1-1988:12.41
Table  2 - The  Size  of the  Shocks:
Standard  Deviations  of  Estimated  Disturbances*
1980:6-1985:6  1985:12-1988:12
Inflation  3.85  0.68
Wage  Growth  7.18  5.55
Ml Growth  6.48  7.91
M3 Growth  5.08  2.45
Credit  Growth  4.15  1.57
Devaluation  (Basket)  4.08  1.53
Devaluation  (Dollar)  3.57  1.26
Controlled  Prices'  Inflation  5.79  0.96
Nominal  Interest  Rate  1.22  0.20
Unemployment  0.49  0.77
Industrial  Production  Growth  6.46  6.29
Employment  Growth  1.38  1.00
Consumption  Growth  6.25  3.96
Trade  Deficit/GDP  0.026  0.024
*  Note:  Each  entry  is the  standard  deviation  of the  estimated  disturbance
from  bivariate  autoregressions  that  used  four  lagged  values  of inflation
and  of the  other  relevant  variable  and  a constant. The  figures  for
inflation  are  based  on autoregressions  that  had lagged  inflation  and  wage
growth  as  explanatory  variables.Table  3  - Variance  Ratios  [V(k);  Equation  (4)  in  Text]
Inflation  Wage  Growth  Devaluation  Controlied  Pri'%es  Ml Growth
k  B  A  B  A  A  A  A
l  4.  *414)(3  34  *  ~34  4  F.  . lotxs`  O.  d.  110
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Real  Interest  Rate  Real  Exchange  Rate  M3 Growth  Trade  neficit
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Employment  G-rowth  Unemployment Rate  Industrial  Production  Growth  Credit Growth
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Table 4 - Simple Phillips-Curve  ReRressions
I. Before the Program (1980:4-1985:6)
(1)  INFt  - -2.625 +  0.455INFt.l  +  4.813Log(UNE)t
(6.171)  (0.126)  (4.080)
R2 0.293  DW =  2.029  SER =  4.327
(2)  INFt  =  0.389 +  0.056INFt-1  +  0.467DPCt +  0.345DERt +  0.623Log(UNE)t
(2.907) (0.069)  (0.053)  (0.079)  (1.938)
R2 = 0.851  DW =  1.876  SER - 2.021
II. Entire Sample (1980:4-1988:12)
(3)  INFt  =  8.953  +  0.672INFt-l  - 3.950Log(UNE)t
(3.776) (0.072)  (2.113)
R2  - 0.488  DW - 2.22  SER  =  4.279
(4)  INFt  =  4.053  +  0.151INFte1  +  0.424DPCt  +  0.296DERt  - 1.799LOg(UNE)t
(1.649) (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.061)  (0.919)
R2 =  0.906  DW =  1.894  SER  =  1.850
Notes: The notation is as follows: INF: Rate of inflation;  UNE: Rate of
unemployment;  DPC: Rate of inflation of controlled prices;
DER: Rate of change of exchange rate.  Figures in parentheses are
standard  errors.44
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Figure  12
Trade  Balance,  Real  Labor  Cost,  and  Unemployment
Trade  Balance  (Seaonally  Adjuated)  1978-86  Real  Labor  Cost  per  Unit  of  output  in  ausiness  Sector
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